The river Don catchment area in Sheffield and Rotherham offers a good place for a case study of flood risk management, given the impact of a flooding event in 2007 and the way in which local events have become entwined with national and international policy shifts. To interpret local policy, a combination of systems based and socio-cultural theory is used. Both the theories and the case study serve to disentangle the multiple meanings of resilience. Understood in opposition to flood resistance, resilience has only limited applicability in an area such as the case study where engineering works protect employment and infrastructure. Resilience as a policy discourse also lacks political transparency and a recognition of socio-cultural influences. Underlying the shift towards resilient styles of management is an appreciation of the importance of capacity, to learn and to act. The case study identifies blockages to the realisation of that capacity.
processes of flows, forces, populations and systems, and the social processes of interest group politics and social order (Archer 1996 : Lockwood 1964 . Given, the existence of hybrid approaches that assume 'coupled systems' between the physical and social worlds (Liu et al 2013) , three relevant frameworks may be identified:  the management of expectations based on the social construction of risk (Hartmann 2012) .
Adaptive management
To discuss each approach in turn: Theories of adaptive management summarise the assumption of many aspects of contemporary flood management, including resilience. In principle, resilience means the ability of the system to absorb or withstand disturbance (Ingirige and Amaratunga 2013) or in technical language, its ability to cope with 'panarchy', an intermediate situation betwee chaos and order, the predictable and the unpredictable (Innes and Booher 1999, 22) . In addition, panarchy and adaptive flood management imply in principle a preference for 'natural', as this term is used in UK policy debates 2 or 'green' flood risk management as used elsewhere (Janssen et al 2015) , without heavy engineering works.
There is, however, a subtle shift in attitudes once panarchy is applied to routine flood protection. In ecological systems, flooding is a natural and potentially creative force. . Once transferred to the management of human environments (Davoudi 2014) and applied to property, with all its legal rigidities (Tempels and Hartmann 2014) , flooding assumes a negative meaning-as system failure. Moreover, in seeking to avoid system failure, the concept of resilience becomes muddied. The ecological concept of resilience involves adaptation in contrast to resistance, this latter meaning the ability to withstand stresses and shocks without change and without dysfunctional consequences (Norris et al 2008) . In policy discourses, however, as for example stated in UK government advice (DEFRA-EA 2010) resilience is likely to encompass specific engineering works intended to ensure that critical infrastructure can withstand extreme events.
Adaptive management is, nevertheless, distinctive in two other ways.
First, the socio-ecological system is assumed to be too large and its behaviour too unpredictable to be engineered as a whole. The management of panarchy involves a search for multiple solutions and multiple measures in a way that favours a process of co-evolution between governmental bodies and other actors, that includes spontaneous responses to events as these occur (Klein et al 1998, 263) and that implies 'community resilience' (Norris et al 2008, as well as ecological resilience.
The latter concept deservies more consideration. Apllied to flooding, community resilience means the ability of local communities to organise and protect themselves and recover through property-level improvements and other measures. Whether residents and businesses can and are likely to do so is another question. The takeup of property-level measures is typically low in the absence of determined efforts to encourage uptake (Bhattacharya-Mis et al 2015) . To give a specific example, a survey of Cockermouth (Cumbria, England) a small, flood affected town found that despite a huge increase in insurance 'only 11%' of small businesses 'had installed flood resilient wall finishes' 3 Communities and firms vary, in their ability and willingness to act and some will not be able to help themselves without material help, rather than just encouragement.
Second, adaptive management is distinct in the range and number of institutional actors who are affected. In relation to a river floodplain, adaptive management would use the local catchment area as a basis for co-ordinated action and would seek to a public consensus on which to base action and detailed management (Innes & Booher 1999) .
Agreeing a co-ordinated, integrated catchment plan is likely to be complex, however. Potential water overspill areas may have very different meanings for locals, experts and managers (Kati and Jari 2016) . Public involvement promotes transparency, but is time consuming and, depending on local circumstances, not necessarily of value in finding flexible solutions (Menzel & Buchecker 2013) . Further, detailed co-ordination and management may prove cumbersome , as Coulthard and Frostick (2010) have suggested in a case study of Hull (East Yorkshire).
Transition management
The limitations of adaptive management suggest that production and consumption practices need to be changed to cope with long-term risks. Transition management deals exactly with this second type of factor and second type of system comprising multiple, overlapping networks of actors, supply chains and associated technology, each locked into particular forms of production and consumption practices and so requires some specific event or external 'push' to facilitate change. Change may be stimulated, for example, through any combination of local experiments, in so-called 'niches' or through a concerted policy effort, the so-called 'regime' of public finance and regulation. Whatever the transition pathway, whether from niches or regimes, however, the emphasis is invariably on planned, managed or intended change rather than a spontaneous cycle of destruction and renewal of socio-ecological systems.
As presented by its main advocates (Geels 2005 : 11: Kemp et al 2007 : Loorbach 2010 , transition management involves a multiple, multi-level passage from one state of a socio-technical system to another, with the state after transition representing a higher level of achievement on a variety of sustainability criteriaenergy use, recycling, pollution, biodiversity and so on. Governments work with producers, in a process of co-evaluation, making products more sustainable and resilient. Co-evolution applied to flood risk management implies a reformulation of the role of local authorities and other public sector actors as an 'honest broker' (Ingirige & Wedawatta 2014 ) who advises property owners on a range of measures.
Co-evolution suggests, in addition, that regulations such as planning controls, building controls and environmental regulation are merely one element in a panoply of measures that steer and redefine economic behaviour in a sustainable direction.
Regulation, including the expectation of future regulation, can promote innovation.
However, regulation is only likely to become effective once extensive compliance is already realised through voluntary means. (Kemp et al 2007 : Parto 2007 . Whether or not transition is fully realised is typically problematic, however. Case studies (Moloney and Horne2015: Vandevyvere & Nevens 2015) suggest that the various levels often fail to work together; for example local initiatives are not sufficiently supported by national government.
The management of expectations
Personal experience and the perception of that experience mark the concerns of the third approach, dealing with the management of expectations . Expectations and perception are linked to awareness. Moreover, awareness of risk is based ultimately on individual experience, knowledge and memory. However, a single 'collective memory' is an impossibility (Douglas 2013, 59-60) Table 1 High grid/ high group styles of action cover conventional land use planning and water engineering. They favour spatial order and the management of nature, using a co-ordinated range of policy measures for different areas, places and types of property. In contrast, low grid/ low group styles are about individual resilience, responsiveness and assume that individual organisation and initiative will suffice.
Low grid/ high group is about the promotion of supportive communities and therefore community resilience, whether residential communities or informal business groups.
The final category, high grid/ low group-isolation and fatalism-might be equated with isolation and hopelessness. In circumstances, where nothing can be done, fatalism may nevertheless be a realistic response.
Grid/ group theory does not offer a system. In the first place, it provides a classification of the varied and 'clumsy' array of perceptions and preferred solutions of different groups and governments (Verweij, Douglas et al 2006) , with the modalities of action reflecting the wider political culture, the institutions already in place and their interaction with one another. Grid/ group theory has been applied to flood management by Hartmann (2012) , but only in a limited way that treats the different logics of action as an aspect of an over-arching policy, rather than in the original sense off Douglas as a shifting set of partly complementary and partly conflicting institutional principles. Grid-group theory is therefore about the management of expectations only as intent. Because expectations involve cultural assumptions and conflicting institutional principles, they may be unmanageable either in whole or part.
In addition, the grid/ group framework assumes a dialectic relationship between 'centre' and 'periphery', between hierarchical governmental agencies and nonhierarchical organizations who feel that they are at the 'border', to use the term of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) 
The frameworks together
Taking all this together, the frameworks may be summarised as follows: Table 2 Adaptive management and transition management are systems approaches concerned with the capacity of governments to manage and reduce risk in the short and long-term in a process of co-evolution with other institional actors. As such they both assume the existence of a rationalist planning cycle, that involves the separation of means and ends and the use of systematic analytical techniques . (Goodchild 2017, 129-133) . The details the planning cycle vary. In adaptive management, the cycle starts from an event such as a disaster and then moves to recovery and longer term strategies, based on the avoidance of similar problems in the future. 4 In transition management, the cycle starts with the identification of agreed targets, expressing different aspects of sustainable practice and of 'pathways' to reach those targets (Geels 2005 : Goodchild 2017 Kemp et al 2007) . For both approaches, however, the planning cycles can be conceived as a series of decision making stages that, encourage social learning, including the evaluation of outcomes. Learning and related concepts such as 'capacity'-to process and evaluate information and to act effectively-are, therefore, a necessary aspect of resilience and in some accounts (Liao 2012 : Newman 2011 ) the defining aspect.
Equally, however, if redefined in terms of learning, the meaning of resilience changes, away from a type of measure to the type of management process. Under the pressure of events, individuals, groups and public authorities learn to anticipate, prevent and cope with events and, in doing so, work out new responses. Put slightly differently, if defined as process the term has no necessary ecological characteristics..
Socio-cultural theory is compatible with a planning cycle that starts with a disaster and also with 'learning' as an individual and institutional process. Douglas (2013, 59) recognises, for example 'the memory of past investigations and prcedents' as an influence on the perception of danger. Other than in the highly managed, high grid approach of bureaucracies, however, socio-cultural theory suggests a relatively flexible, pragmatic and sometimes reactive style of learning, without deliberate decision making stages.
The case study
The river Don catchment in Sheffield and Rotherham illustrates many aspects of current approaches to the management of flood risk, especially in an urban area where the risk affects business and employment. It is also a good place for a case study as local events have become entwined with initiatives at an all England and, in some cases European Union (EU) level. Other studies have examined business resilience per se 5 and the tension in environmental design between technical expertise and local place attachment (Haughton 2015) . The interest here is about the relationship between flood protection, business and urban governance at a strategic, district-wide level.
Methodology and presentation
The underlying methodology is informed by a modified version of the 'phronetic' method of Flyvbjerg (2004 Flyvbjerg ( : 2006 . Phronesis is the Greek word for practical judgement. The phronetic method involves bringing together and, where necessary, contrasting varied information to reveal the interrelations between technical rationalities and the power of interest groups. This case study brings together and contrasts different sources of information. It is concerned, however with the capacity as well as the power of different actors and, in addition, the extent to which local policy and practice is consistent with the various theoretical frameworks and a shift to resilience.
In this context, the main institutional actors are as follows; The intention throughout was to generate a narrative showing the interaction between events, analyses and the response of instutional actors. The presentation of the case study therefore starts with a summary of the problem, before moving to the policy response and then, in a subsequent section, a discussion of the policy response in the light of the theories and previous studies. As such, the narrative is intended to disentangle the chronology of events from its interpretation.
Chronology and interpretation cannot be wholly separated however. The account starts with a sudden event, a flood, followed by exercises in learning and innovation. The structure of the account might therefore suggest implicit support for the existence of a rationalist planning process. Subsequent events have not followed a single planning cycle, however. Different cycles of plan preparation and implementation have operated alongside one another depending on the involvement of different layers of government or different policy fields and initiatives. Financial constraints and the existence of separate financial planning cycles have led to proposals being modified, sometimes at short notice. Further, the response of residents and local amenity groups has mostly arisen once the consultation process has reached place-specific proposals rather at a strategic stage. Yet this response may itself challenge key aspects of a proposal. Actions, measures and decisions may therefore be rational as a pragmatic response to constraints, but not rationalist in the sense of following a prescriptive model of stages of decision making and action.
Characteristics of the problem
On 25 June 2007 extreme rain overwhelmed the drainage system in the Done valley catchment area. In Sheffield, alone, over 1,200 homes were flooded and more than 1,000 businesses were affected (SCC, 2013b, 14) , including industries of national importance. Flood waters rose rapidly, catching people unaware and requiring their evacuation from their work place or home. Thousands were left without power and two people died.
The dramatic events of 2007 are not easily forgotten for those directly affected.
One respondent working for a local agency had been directly affected by the floods and provided a vivid account:
'From our office window we … were watching this stream of water at the side of the road that grew to a foot wide in less than three or four minutes and then grew to three foot wide in another five to ten minutes and it was a case of people need to move, we need to let people get out cos it was bad. We used to park across the road, by the time I'd got packed up and we were heading out I got across that road and it was about a foot deep.'
The river Don within Sheffield and Rotherham is 'little more than a large stream' in normal conditions (SCC, 2013b, 2) , as shown in Figure 1 . Table 3 Non-residential includes public buildings, but may be taken as a proxy for businesses. The total number of residential and non-residential properties at risk is less in Rotherham than in Sheffield. However, Rotherham includes a concentration of non-residential properties at high risk mostly located in and near the town centre. Figure 3 shows the relevant pattern using a kernel density mapping technique (Silverman, 1986 ). MARE and CAMINO, were intended to promote experimentation, innovation and multi-national learning. Partly for this reason, they included initiatives that subsequently either failed, as in a proposed regional flood management body or for which there is no record of implementation, as in a proposal to promote property level measures through intermediaries such as DIY stores (Annexes 16 and 17).
Even if limited in their impact, however, CAMINO and MARE provided additional staff funding at a time when the resources of the local authorities were tested. Indeed, lack of staffing resources was itself a reason for their lack of impact. For example, in the view of a respondent, a senior local government officer, the regional initiative failed because:
'it was local authority based and ... the difficulties that local authorities have been undergoing in recent years.' 'I bet there's not one in five of the people who used to go to that organisation still working for local authorities, it's been savage.'
Once EU funding disappeared, the local authority lost capacity to organise and to act.
The Pitt review (2008) was different. It had a national frame of reference and sought to summarise all relevant policy measures, covering seven main issues:
reducing the risk of flooding and its impact; the provision of emergency services;
protecting essential services; better advice and help to those affected; speeding up recovery; better prediction in advance. A governmental progress report (DEFRA 2012) stated that, of the report's 92 specific recommendations, 43 had been implemented, 40 were partly implemented and a further nine were subject to further reviews or other complications.
However, the government's assessment overstates the extent of implementation. To give an example: Pitt Review recommendation 12 (2008, xvi) states 'All local authorities should extend eligibility for home improvement grants and loans to include flood resistance and resilience products.' The eligibility of property level grant aid was indeed confirmed by administrative action and was also extended to business properties. However, eligibility is only an initial step. The funds also have to be made available and in many parts of the country, including South Yorkshire, flood resilience work is not a major theme in the small housing improvement programmes currently in force.
The longer term response in Sheffield and Rotherham was undertaken within the framework of the strategic management plans that were another recommendation of the Pitt Review and were undertaken in accordance with a preference for an explicitly coordinated multi-agency 'partnership' (EA 2010). The same approach was also favoured by the MARE project under whose imprint the earliest plans were published.
To take policies in Sheffield and Rotherham in turn: In Sheffield, policy emerged largely through a process of exclusion. The Lower Don Valley and adjacent areas were identified as priority areas, this being 'driven by the need to sustain the economic and regeneration processes of the area' (SCC, 2013a). Formal defences in the city were few (SCC 2013b, 18) and difficult to finance. The possibility of flood relief spillways was impractical owing to the built-up character of the floodplain (SCC 2013a, 17). Moreover, 'building resilience within the community' was discounted 'as most of the existing buildings in the areas considered could not easily be adapted to withstand flooding.' (SCC 2013b, 9) .
Despite references to community involvement, the initial style of decision making was led by experts (consultants and officials). Where consultation took place, with emphasis was on protecting business. At the same time, the cost of increased flood protection could not easily be justified under the funding formulas then in force.
Instead, the local authority approached the business community to fill the gap through the declaration of a Business Improvement District (BID) for the Lower Don
Valley-an area that covers a mixture of small traders near the city centre and a mixture of medium sized and large employers elsewhere.
A BID is a legal mechanism, most commonly used in town and city centres, In additionthe search for more extensive upstream water storage led, during 2016, to proposals to impound flood waters in existing parks at Endcliffe and Millhouses and in amenity woodland elsewhere. 11 The proposals are acknowledged to be 'sensitive' by officials (Sheffield Star, 27/07/2016 and 27/10/2016) and, at the time of the study, were subject to public consultation, the form of which was itself contested. Concerned groups argue that more attention be paid to flood management on agricultural land and through the use of existing water reservoirs. Other toolkits and sources of advice are available, for example from the Association of British Insurers (2016). However, the use of property-level toolkits is itself of limited value, as became apparent in the interviews. For the local authority, their publication amounted to an admission that it could no longer protect the highest risk areas. Indeed, in one passage, the Rotherham local plan states that 'ideally development should be moved away from these areas' (RMDC 2014, 144) . There has been no attempt to implement any such policy, however.
For businesses, the advice given in the toolkits was not a priority, even if they were aware of the contents. In the words of an informant with much experience of local businesses:
'sometimes it can be a hard push ….. They (the businesses) are always trading off against other things that are important … and … some of these things that are deemed aren't quite as important as others, until something happens. ... People generally do the basics, what they absolutely must do to get through.'
The language of the advice was also problematic:
'having looked at some of the material I have to say not a lot of it's very visual, it's a lot of written stuff and they use a lot of terminology which is not self-explanatory to business people '
Every property is different and the application of the guidance to specific cases is often unclear in the absence of specialist advice that would be expensive to obtain. For smaller businesses, some support would be necessary. Yet, the local authority no longer has sufficient staff resources to offer free advice, if indeed it ever had the necessary staff resources. Some businesses assume that property-level protection is not for them, either because they have not been previously flooded or because of subsequent flood prevention measures or because the property is apparently unsuitable. In the words of the Director of a small business flooded in 2007 and continuing in an unprotected area of the floodplain. 'There's not much we can do to be honest, it'll just be a case of cracking on and trying to clean it up'.
Discussion: the events in perspective
The published documentation and the comments of respondents suggest an openended, continuing process of risk management, much as is the assumption of socioecological theories. The direction of change has been towards resilience, in line with most accounts. The extent of change can be easily exaggerated, however, depending on the exact meaning of resilience. For example, of the seven groups of recommendations listed in the Pitt review, only two: 'speeding up recovery' and the provision of 'better advice and help' fall directly within the scope of 'resilience' understood in ecological terms opposition to resistance.
To say that the shift towards resilience is qualified is another way of saying that the promotion of resilience rather than resistance runs into a series of practical obstacles if taken too far. Yes, it is sensible to encourage residents, property owners and businesses to co-operate with one another and help themselves. However, the The opposition between local residents and technical analysis has been interpreted by Haughton (2015) as a product of place attachment and its associated emotions. Other related interpretations are that conflicts arise owing to different priorities about the use of space (Kati and Jari 2016) or to contrasting attitudes to nature, for example between conservationists and the demands of securitisation (Davoudi 2014) . Emotions in planning and environmental policy are, of course, not just confined to place attachment. The experience of flooding and the threat to jobs is also an emotional issue, but this only serves to intensify the potential for conflict.
In this context, if local groups are to have an effective voice, they will almost certainly need some form of technical support to allow the investigation of alternative methods of retaining flood water in places where it can do less damage. The use of amenity areas for water storage is controversial, but relatively simple in conception and simple in relation to the range of stakeholders. Other methods raise a multiplicity of issues and these go beyond the legal rigidities associated with property (Tempels and Hartmann, 2014) . In some cases, such as the opening up culverted streams, the pattern of legal rights and obligations may indeed prove complex and disputed.
Otherwise, the main obstacles derive from the use of property, rather than its legal character-the interests and expectations of owners and businesses, including In Rotherham and Sheffield, issues of close administrative coordination have proved less important in the narrative of flood risk management than in the account of Hull by Coulthard and Frostick (2010) . Hull is low lying and surface drainage is dependent on pumping stations that are owned by Yorkshire Water. As the comparison suggests, the material character of flood risk remains significant in determining the detailed administrative and policy arrangements.
Conclusions
Consideration of both theory and the case study require a clarification of the relation between theory and practice. Adaptive management and transition management both highlight risk management as a continuous and wide ranging exercise rather a series of disconnected engineering projects. Both involve social learning and therefore have value as normative theories that provide criteria of good and bad practice. Both approaches, for example, highlight the blockages to learning, as these have arisen in the case study area.
-the staffing costs involved in innovation and consultation;
-the difficulties of reaching and communicating with small businesses so as to encourage property-level measures;
-the lack of national support for transition measures; and -the complexity of dealing with a multiplicity of stakeholders and landowners with particular interests.
Nevertheless, confusions arise when adaptive management is conflated simply with 'resilience', used without a precise definition. It is confusing, to use ecological concepts of 'resilience' so as to exclude any engineering works whatsoever. The conditions in Sheffield with existing heavily engineered watercourses and employment already concentrated on a floodplain amply demonstrates exactly how resilience and resistance, including engineering works, may co-exist with one another. Confusion is compounded, moreover, by a lack of political transparency.
Understandings of resilience as process involve or imply a series of desirable attributes, responsiveness, effectiveness etc. Yet the policy discourse on resilience has also amounted to a tendency for the state to shift funding responsibility towards individuals, firms and businesses. That is exactly the implications of the BID in Sheffield and the property-level toolkits in Rotherham. Any such shift in responsibility will not necessarily be welcomed by those affected. For these reasons, policy and practice rests on an ambiguous and shifting balance between resistance and resilience.
Politics and, as socio-cultural theory suggests, political culture are therefore crucial to events. Different styles of action involve different institutional arrangements, notably about the extent of individual and collective responsibility.
Measures are, likely to reflect in part the campaigns of amenity and environmental groups in promoting oppositional, critical 'green' policies and solutions. Finally, learning is grounded in memory, so suggesting a need to maintain a collective, public memory of the 2007 event, even as personal memories fade. 
